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STEIN v. NEW YORK
substantial rights, might be disregarded, but of such preju-
dice as always to amount to a denial of due process, 0 and
concluded with a note that the decision here would have
been otherwise if the constitutional school of thought pre-
vailing in the late forties were still dominant."'
As to any change of constitutional school of thought it
should be noted that in two very recent cases, one decided
in 1952 and the other in early 1953, with the same member-
ship as here the Court, speaking through justices who
found with the majority here, repeated and sustained the
Malinski doctrine.2 But here the Malinski doctrine ap-
peared in a new light, and the majority of the Court, per-
ceiving its evil effect on a traditional procedure, cast it
aside in favor of sustaining the constitutionality of that
procedure.
RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE CONFRONTED WITH
HIS ACCUSERS NOT GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Stein v. People of the State of New York'
In the same case as noted in the preceding casenote,
upon objection of the petitioner who did not confess that
the admission of the confessions of his co-defendants im-
plicating him in the crime denied him his constitutional
right to be confronted with his accusers as guaranteed by
the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the sharply divided Court,2 held: that there was no con-
stitutional right in state criminal proceedings under the
Fourteenth Amendment to be confronted with one's ac-
cusers and to be allowed to cross examine them.8
Petitioner's basic contention was that there was a fed-
eral right of confrontation in state criminal proceedings.
The Court met this contention with West v. Louisiana,4
where in dicta the Court had clearly stated that the right
of confrontation, granted in Federal criminal proceedings
8
'Ibid, 204.
S Ibid, 208, note *.
Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 (1952) ; Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443 (1953).
'346 U. S. 156 (1953). This is a companion casenote to the preceding one
and, since arising out of the same case, the facts set out in the previous
casenote apply here.
As pointed out in the prior note, circa, footnote 29, this was a 6-3 de-
cision, Justice Jackson for the Court, with Justices Frankfurter, Black, and
Douglas in dissent. However, the only dissent to specifically mention the
point here involved was that of Justice Black, 197.8 Supra, n. 1, 195.
'194 U. S. 258 (1904).
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by the Sixth Amendment, could not be read into the con-
cept of due process guaranteed in state proceedings by the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 The decision relied upon by the
petitioner, Snyder v. Massachusetts,6 merely assumed the
right of confrontation to have been reinforced by the Four-
teenth Amendment. The hearsay rule, which formed the
basis of the right of confrontation was not to be read into
the Fourteenth Amendment.8
Justice Black in dissenting relied on his opinion in In re
Oliver9 to sustain the position that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process included the right of confrontation, ° and
considered West v. Louisiana as not controlling."
From a number of decisions beginning with Hurtado v.
California," a doctrine of the Court has been formulated
that only those rights guaranteed in the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitutions which are fundamental to our
basic concepts of politics and justice are to be read into
the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteed in state trials.'"
Obviously there is no clear line between so fundamental
and not so fundamental rights ;14 and the Court has admitted
that the circumstances in each situation play a great part
in determining whether the right denied was so funda-
mental. The Court had never before been squarely faced
with the constitutionality of a denial of confrontation in a
state criminal proceeding but in several statements by way
of dicta had appeared to weave from one side to the other
as to whether it was truly such a fundamental right.'8 Here
they met the problem head on and refused to recognize a
federal right to confrontation in a state case.
5 Ibid, 261-263.
6 291 U. S. 97 (1934).7 Supra, n. 1, 195, n. 38, quoting from the Snyder case, ibid, 107.
8 Ibid, 196.
9333 U. S. 257 (1948).
10 Supra, n. 1, 197.
nIbid, note *.
110 U. S. 516 (1884).
1 See note, 2 Md. L. Rev. 174 (1938), listing the rights so protected.
1Ibid, 176.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1942).
18 In West v. Louisiana, supra, n. 4, 262-263, Justice Peckham considered
confrontation to be not such a fundamental right. Justice Cardozo in
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 8upra, n. 6, 106, assumed confrontation to be such
a fundamental right, but in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324, noted,
2 Md. L. Rev. 174 (1938), in lining up the various specific rights granted
in the first eight amendments mentioned "the other provisions of the Sixth",
as being not fundamental, citing West v. Louisiana. Justice Black in In re
Oliver, supra, n. 9, considered the fundamental right to one's day in court
to include a right to examine the witnesses against him. See also: 5 WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940), See. 1397; especially n. 1, thereto which
lists 44 states whose constitutions grant a right of confrontation and 3 other
states whose legislatures have enacted statutes providing such a right. In
Maryland, the Declaration of Rights, Art. XXI, gives such a right.
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